Why Speed Doesn’t Kill: Learning to Believe in Disinflation by Eric Schaling & Marco Hoeberichts
 























Working Paper Number 164 
                                                 
1 Wits Business School, Johannesburg, South Africa 
2 Economics and Research Division, De Nederlandsche Bank, Amsterdam, The Netherlands Why Speed Doesn’t Kill: Learning to Believe in Disinﬂation
Eric Schaling∗and Marco Hoeberichts†
February 26, 2010
Abstract
Central bankers generally prefer to reduce inﬂation gradually. We show that a central bank
may try to convince the private sector of its commitment to price stability by choosing to reduce
inﬂation quickly. We call this "teaching by doing". We ﬁnd that allowing for teaching by doing
eﬀects always speeds up the disinﬂation and leads to lower inﬂation persistence. So, we clarify
why "speed" in the disinﬂation process does not necessarily "kill" in the sense of creating large
output losses. This result also holds in an environment where private agents learn about the
central bank’s inﬂation target using a constant gain algorithm.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Central banks throughout the world have adopted long-run price stability as their primary goal.
There is agreement among central bankers, academics and ﬁnancial market representatives that low
or zero inﬂation is the appropriate long-run goal of monetary policy. However, there is less agreement
on what strategies should be adopted to achieve price stability.
The preference of central bankers - as expressed by King (1996) at the Kansas City Fed sym-
posium on Achieving Price Stability at Jackson Hole - seems to be for a gradual timetable, with
inﬂation targets consistently set below the public’s inﬂation expectations.
Throughout, King (1996) emphasises the role of learning by central banks and the public. He
shows how the optimal speed of disinﬂation depends crucially on whether the private sector imme-
diately believes in the new low inﬂation regime or not. If they do, the best strategy is to disinﬂate
quickly, since the output costs are zero. Of course, if expectations are slower to adapt, disinﬂation
should be more gradual as well.
But the latter case is problematic, since the learning process implies that the learning parameter
does not depend on the monetary regime. Put diﬀerently, the updating mechanism does not reﬂect
the actual speed of disinﬂation, and thus it is not clear whether the private sector expectations mech-
anism is rational. Our suggestion in this paper is that, alternatively learning about the disinﬂation
could be modelled using a two-period Bayesian set-up and along the lines of Evans and Honkapohja
(2001). These cases are analysed in sections 3 and 5.
In his discussion of endogenous learning King (1996, p. 68) says that a central bank may try to
convince the private sector of its commitment to price stability by choosing to reduce its inﬂation
target towards zero quickly. King calls this "teaching by doing". Then the choice of a particular
inﬂation rate inﬂuences the speed at which expectations adjust to price stability.
The problem however, with the King (1996) model is that the central bank decides on its optimal
disinﬂation plan given those private sector expectations. Thus, although King calls this case teaching
by doing, a more accurate description would be "doing without teaching".
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1In sections 4 and 5 "teaching by doing" is modelled diﬀerently. We allow the central bank’s
"doing" to aﬀect private sector learning. Of course, if the central bank recognises its potential for
active "teaching" its incentive structure changes. More speciﬁc, it should realise that by disinﬂating
faster, it can reduce the associated output costs by "teaching" the private sector that it means
business. Thus, the dependence of private sector expectations on the actual inﬂation rate should be
part of its optimisation problem.
This is in fact what we ﬁnd: allowing for "teaching by doing" eﬀects always speeds up the
disinﬂation vis-à-vis the case where this eﬀect is absent. So, in this paper we clarify why "speed" in
the disinﬂation process does not necessarily "kill" in the sense of creating large output losses.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines King’s model. In Section
3 we modify the King model with Bayesian learning. In Section 4 we look at "teaching by doing".
Section 5 generalises the two-period model of Section 3 to a multi-period setting along the lines of
Evans and Honkapohja (2001) . Our conclusions are given in Section 6. The appendices provide the
derivations of the optimal monetary policy rules discussed in sections 4 and 5 of the paper.
2 The King Model of Disinﬂation Under Discretion
King (1996) discusses disinﬂation policy using a simple macroeconomic model, which combines
nominal wage and price stickiness and slow adjustment of expectations to a new monetary policy
regime. The model analyses the interaction between private sector expectations and the monetary
regime, and in particular the speed at which the inﬂation target implicit in the latter converges
to price stability. It features nominal rigidity and an optimising central bank that trades oﬀ price
(inﬂation) versus output stabilisation.
More speciﬁcally, the model has three key equations aggregate supply, monetary policy prefer-
ences and inﬂation expectations. Aggregate supply exceeds the natural rate of output when inﬂation
is higher than was expected by agents when nominal contracts were set. This is captured by a simple
short-run Phillips curve1
zt = πt − πe
t
2 (1)
Here πtis the rate of inﬂation, zt is the output gap and πe
t indicates the expectation of inﬂation
as the subjective expectation (belief) of private agents. This belief does not necessarily coincide
with rational expectations. The model is not restrictive as long as inﬂation expectations are in part
inﬂuenced by past monetary policy (see e.g., Bomﬁm and Rudebusch (2000) and Yetman (2003)). 3
T h er e g i m ec h a n g ei sr e p r e s e n t e db yan e wi n ﬂation target π∗, which is announced to the public
at the end of period t−1. The new target is lower than the initial steady state inﬂation rate, denoted
by π0.
The central bank’s objective as of period t is to choose a sequence of current and future inﬂation
rates {πτ}
∞





τ−tL(πτ,z τ) 4 (2)
1In their analysis of U.S. monetary policy experimentation in the 1960s, Cogley, Colacito and Sargent (2005) use
a model similar to ours but with unemployment instead of output.
2For analytical convenience, we abstract from stochastic productivity shocks and the slope of the Phillips curve is
set equal to unity.
3In the present paper - given expectations - the output costs of disinﬂation are constant and given by the slope of
the Phillips curve. Here this parameter is normalised at unity. However, if we allow the output costs of disinﬂation
to vary with the inﬂation rate, the central bank’s incentives change substantially. Thus, one way of extending the
model with state-contingent output costs of disinﬂation would be by means of a non-linear Phillips curve as discussed






a(πτ − π∗)2 +( zτ)2¤
Et denotes expectations conditional on the central bank’s information set at time t.T h ep a r a m e t e r
0 ≤ a<∞is the relative weight on inﬂation stabilisation, while 0 <δ≤ 1is the discount factor.
The timing of events is such that the central bank chooses its disinﬂation policy after private
sector inﬂation expectations are set. In the terminology of game theory, the private sector is a
Stackelberg leader and the central bank is a Stackelberg follower.
King (1996) analyses two extreme cases of inﬂation formation: (1) a completely credible pol-
icy regime where private sector expectations adjust immediately to the inﬂation target (since the
announcement is fully credible). This is the case of rational or model consistent expectations; (2)
exogenous learning. In this case, the output costs of disinﬂation are non-trivial but depend solely
on the mechanics of the inﬂation expectations, which in turn do not reﬂect the monetary regime.
The above statements can be analysed more precisely by explicitly considering the central bank’s
optimisation problem (where it takes inﬂation expectations as given, that is under discretion). The
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− μt [zτ − πτ + πe
τ]
)
Deﬁning zt as the state variable, and πtas the control variable, the ﬁrst-order conditions are
∂L
∂πt
= Et [−a(πt − π∗)+μt]=0
∂L
∂zt
= Et[−zt − μt]=0









Of course, from (E3) it is clear that if expectations are slower to adapt, the disinﬂation should be
more gradual as well. This can be easily seen from the simpler case where π∗ =0 .T h e n w e g e t
πt = 1
1+aπe
t;t h a ti s ,t h ei n ﬂation rate should decline as a constant proportion of the exogenous
expected inﬂation rate.
In general, expectations are aﬀected both by the inﬂation target and by actual inﬂation perfor-
mance. After experiencing high inﬂation for a long period of time, there may be good reasons for
the private sector not to believe the disinﬂation policy fully (see also Bomﬁm and Rudebusch (2000)
and Schaling (2003)). In light of this, King assumes that private sector inﬂation expectations follow
a simple rule, that is a linear function of the inﬂation target and the lagged inﬂation rate
πe
t = ρπt−1 +( 1− ρ)π∗ (4)
This is termed endogenous learning. The smaller is 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 the faster is the learning process.
Thus, ρ captures the credibility of the new regime. The closer is ρto zero, the higher is the credibility
o ft h er e g i m ec h a n g e . 5 For a positive value of ρ expected inﬂation converges asymptotically to the
inﬂation target. Then given this expectations mechanism, we can derive the central bank’s optimal
disinﬂation policy.
5Put diﬀerently, the lowerρ, the better inﬂation expectations are anchored at long horizons. For an empirical
analysis for the U.S. examining observable measures of long-run inﬂation expectations, see Kiley (2008).









In the simpler case where π∗ =0 ,w eg e tπt =
ρ
1+aπt−1; that is the inﬂation rate should decline
as a constant proportion of the exogenous expected (lagged) inﬂation rate.
Obviously, case 3 is a mixture of cases 1 and 2. Expectations do not adjust immediately (they
depend on actual inﬂation experience, and hence on the policy choices made during the transition),
but are not completely exogenous either. But case 3 is problematic, since the learning process
implies that the learning parameter ρ does not depend on the monetary regime. Put diﬀerently, the
updating mechanism does not reﬂect the actual speed of disinﬂation, and thus the private sector
expectations mechanism is problematic
Our ﬁrst suggestion is that, alternatively, case 3 could be modelled with the aid of Bayesian
learning. Therefore in the next section of the paper we modify the model with Bayesian learning.
3D i s i n ﬂa t i o ni nat w o - p e r i o dm o d e lw i t hp r i v a t es e c t o r
learning
In general, an announcement by the central bank that in future the inﬂation target will be consistent
with price stability, does not command immediate credibility. It takes time for the private sector
to be convinced that the target will be chosen to be consistent with price stability. The private
sector will try to learn about the true preferences of the central bank. Their pronouncements will
not necessarily be taken at face value.
As pointed out by King (1996, p. 64) modelling learning is diﬃcult, therefore consider ﬁrst a
two-period version of the King model of section 2 extended with learning. All other assumptions
and parameters remain as per section 2. The idea is to bring inﬂa t i o nd o w nf r o mi t si n i t i a ll e v e l ,π0
say, to a situation of price stability where inﬂation is zero. Thus, the central bank has to disinﬂate
the economy by π0 percentage points. We assume that this “inﬂation stabilisation plan” has full
credibility and that the only uncertainty is about its timing.7 Thus, at the end of period 2 inﬂation
has to be 0 under all scenarios, i.e.
π2 =0 (6)
and this is believed by the private sector. The question now is how should the disinﬂation be spread
over time?
One strategy is a cold turkey approach. In that case, the central bank disinﬂates the economy
in period 1 by π0 percentage points and does nothing in period 2.
The other strategy is a gradualist approach where the central bank inﬂates according to
∆π1,2
½
−qπ0 in period 1
−(1 − q)π0 in period 2 (7)
where 0 <q<1 is the fraction of the disinﬂation that takes place in period 1.
At the start of period 1, under Bayesian learning wage setters assign a prior probability x1 to
the event that the central bank disinﬂates everything in one go (x1 =P robhπ1 =0 i), i.e. follows
the cold turkey policy and (1 − x1) to the complementary event that the central bank follows a
gradualist policy ((1 − x1)=P robhπ1 > 0i).
6Note that in case of a fully credible regime switch ρ =0 and we have πt = π∗ = πe
t.
7This assumption will be relaxed in Section 5.
4By observing monetary policy in period 1, wage setters learn something about the true nature
of the policy. Wage setters’ beliefs, x1, are then revised according to Bayes’ rule.8 Period 2 nominal
wages are then set on the basis of the posterior beliefs, x2.
If wage setters observe either a positive (π1 > 0) or a zero inﬂation rate (π1 =0 )in period 1,
Bayes’ rule9 suggests how to rationally update these prior beliefs
x2 =P r obhq =1 |π1i =
Probhπ1 =0 i.Probhπ1|q =1 i
Probhπ1i
=
x1 Probhπ1|q =1 i
Probhπ1i
(8)
Hence, the posterior probability that the central bank follows a cold turkey policy is given by the
prior multiplied by the conditional probability of observing the policy π1 given that the central bank
follows a cold turkey policy, divided by the unconditional (prior) probability of observing the policy
π1.
Clearly, if the gradualist policy is followed in period 1, (E8) gives x2 =0 10, since a central bank
that follows a cold turkey strategy would never have accommodated inﬂation expectations:
(Probhπ1 > 0|q =1 i =0 )
Similarly, if the cold turkey strategy is followed in period 1, (E8) gives x2 =1 11,s i n c eaC B
that follows a cold turkey strategy disinﬂates everything in period 1 with probability 1:
(Probhπ1 =0|q =1 i =1 ) .
Thus we have the following rational private learning process
x2 =
½
1 if π1 =0
0 otherwise (9)
Since only a gradualist central bank leaves any inﬂation in the economy, and if it does at the rate
π0 − qπ0 =( 1− q)π0, expected inﬂation at time 0 for period 1 is
E0π1 =( 1− x1)(1− q)π0 (10)
Note that this expression can be interpreted also in the context of King’s case of “endogenous
learning”. Using ˜ ρ as shorthand for (1 − x1)(1− q), (E10) can be written as
E0π1 =˜ ρπ0 where 0 < ˜ ρ<1 (11)
Thus, here rational expectations can display some of the backward-looking characteristics of
traditional adaptive expectations.12
8This is somewhat similar to the analysis by Huh et al. (2000) where agents update their prior assessment of the
true inﬂation target in a (quasi) Bayesian way on the basis of the central bank’s success or failure in reducing inﬂation
over time.
9Bayes’ rule is ProbhA | Bi =


















12More speciﬁc, in this context equation (A2) would read E0π1 = ρπ0.
5Here we assume that the central bank has full knowledge of the process of private sector learning,
or in other words we have what Gaspar, Smets and Vestin (2006) call “sophisticated central banking”.
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∗ (1 − q)π0 (14)
Note that if a →∞from (E14) it follows that the optimal period 1 inﬂation rate is zero. This
means that in this case the central bank will follow a cold turkey strategy.
















From this expression we see that the sacriﬁce ratio is lower the faster the “speed of learning” ˜ ρ.F r o m
(E11) it follows that now the “speed of learning” ˜ ρ - and hence the sacriﬁce ratio - does depend on
the (private sector’s expectations of the) monetary regime.14 For example, if the prior probability
that the central bank follows a cold turkey policy increases, the private sector will attach less weight
to the past inﬂation rate, as a basis for forecasting next year’s inﬂation.15 That is, ∂x
∂˜ ρ < 0.
Equation (E14) suggests several things. Assuming that the central bank cares about output,
0 <a<∞,t h eﬁrst is that the central bank will only follow a cold turkey strategy (π∗
1 =0 )if the
private sector is convinced it will (x1 =1 ) . So, in this case beliefs (or rather, priors) are self-fulﬁlling.
Next, if the private sector thinks the central bank might be gradualist (x1 < 1) the central bank
will indeed be gradualist. However, it will be less gradual than the private sector expects.
Hence, here beliefs are partly self-fulﬁlling. The reason is that the central bank not only cares
about output, and hence about appeasing labour market participants, but also about inﬂation itself.
Of course, the more it cares about inﬂation (the bigger a) t h eg r e a t e rt h ei n c e n t i v et o“ s p e e du p ”
the disinﬂation. If the central bank only cared about output - that is, if aw e r ee q u a lt oz e r o-t h e n
it would exactly accommodate the above expectations and follow the same timing. If it does care
about inﬂation as well (a>0), it will speed up things and disinﬂate faster than the private sector
expects. Figure 3.1 illustrates.
How “gradualist” the central bank will be exactly, can be seen from equation (E16).16
14For an application of linear updating rules in an empirical model of the US economy see Bomﬁm et al. (1997).
15Thus here the speed of learning is deﬁned as the inverse of the weight attached to past inﬂation as a basis for
forecasting future inﬂation.
16This equation has been obtained as follows. We start with the deﬁnition
π1 = π0 + ∆π1
Substituting for ∆π1 from equation(7) we get π1=(1 − q)π0. I nt u r ns u b s t i t u t i o nf o rπ1 from (13) yields 1
1+a E
0π1=(1 − q)∗ π0.This can be rearranged as(16).
6(1 − q)
∗ =
(1 − x1)(1− q)
(1 + a)
(16)
So the ex post degree of gradualism is always smaller than the ex ante degree. Of course the
latter is the private sector’s prior.17 Thus, the central bank will always disinﬂate faster than the
private sector thinks. This is reminiscent of section 2 (the King model) where the optimal disinﬂation
strategy is also to accommodate partially inﬂation expectations
Finally, this section suggests that the central bank’s optimal disinﬂation strategy is to be grad-
ualist if (i) it cares about output and (ii) the prior that it might follow a gradualist strategy is
non zero (1 − x1 > 0). Moreover, what is also interesting about this set-up is that if central bank
statements inﬂuence private sector priors, such central bank talk is not cheap. This means that you
can’t communicate an inﬂation stabilisation programme without at the same time being constrained
by your words.
4 Endogenous Inﬂation Persistence: Teaching by Doing
In this section we allow the central bank’s "doing" to aﬀect private sector learning. Of course, if
the central bank recognises its potential for active "teaching" its incentive structure changes. More
speciﬁcally, it should realise that by disinﬂating faster, it can reduce the associated output costs by
"teaching" the private sector that it means business. All other assumptions remain as in section 2.
Now we allow the central bank’s “doing” to aﬀect private sector learning. Thus, he dependence
of private sector expectations on the actual inﬂation rate — equation
πe
t = ρπt−1 (17)
should be part of its optimisation problem. In what follows we refer to this as the case of “endogenous
persistence”.18 We analyse this for the inﬁnite horizon case (of which the two-period model would
be a special case).19
Now, the central bank’s problem is to choose {πτ}
∞













subject to (E1) and (E6).
It is convenient to deﬁne xt = πe
t = EPS
t−1πt as the state variable and ut = πt as the control. We
solve this problem by the method of Lagrange multipliers.20 Introduce the Lagrange multiplier μt,















τ−t+1μτ+1 [xτ+1 − ρuτ]
¾#
(19)




(1 + a)+δρ2 <C 1 <
δρ2 +1
(1 + a)+δρ2 (20)
17This is in fact equal to (1−x1). Now, (1−x1) - the ex-ante degree — is known to the private sector, but not(1 − q)∗,
the ex-post degree.
18The case where the central bank does not internalize this constraint is referred to as “naïve discretion”.
19For an analysis in a two-period context see Hoeberichts and Schaling (2006).
20For a discussion of the relative merits of the methods of dynamic programming and Lagrange, see Schaling
(2001). Svensson (1999) and Vestin (2006) solve optimal discretionary policy (which in their papers is also a dynamic
optimisation problem) using dynamic programming.
21See Bullard and Schaling (2001) and Schaling (2002) for examples of the method of solving for the optimal policy.






















From equation (E21) i tc a nb es e e nt h a tt h eo p t i m a lv a l u eo ft h i sc o e ﬃcient is a nonlinear
function of the central bank’s weight on inﬂation stabilisation a, the discount factor δ and the
extent to which inﬂation expectations depend on past inﬂation ρ in
πe
t = ρπt−1 +( 1− ρ)π∗ (22)
that is the lack of credibility of the new regime (the closer is ρto zero, the higher is the credibility
o ft h er e g i m ec h a n g e ) .
In Appendix A.1 we derive:
Proposition 1 If the central bank’s weight on inﬂation stabilisation is positive (that is if a>0),
optimal disinﬂation under “teaching by doing” is always faster than optimal disinﬂation under naïve
discretion; that is faster than in the King model.
Further, we show:
Proposition 2 The higher a the lower the optimal value of the feedback parameter C1.
For the proof, see Appendix A.1. The argument is as follows. A central bank that is more
concerned with inﬂation will be less concerned with output, and hence will accommodate inﬂation
expectations to a lesser extent.
We can also derive a result in terms of the central bank’s discount factor. In Appendix A.1 we
verify:
Proposition 3 The higher δ the lower the optimal value of the feedback parameter C1.
The intuition is that the higher δ, the more concerned the central bank is about the future,
i.e. the longer is its policy horizon (conversely if this parameter is zero, the central bank only
“lives for today”). Under a live-for-today policy, the central bank is not interested how monetary
accommodation today aﬀects inﬂation expectations for tomorrow. If it becomes more concerned
about the future (higher δ) however, it will start paying attention to expected future “expectations
invoices”, and accommodate current inﬂation expectations to a lesser extent, hence the monetary
accommodation coeﬃcient C1 falls.
As pointed out by Kiley (2008), with regard to inﬂation dynamics, the degree of anchoring
of inﬂation expectations is central in most empirical and theoretical applications as inﬂation is a
function of inﬂation expectations in most treatments. This is also true in this context. Let us
therefore now look how the central bank responds to less faith in its inﬂation target, as proxied by
a higher weight placed on past inﬂation by private agents in forecasting future inﬂation. It is easy
to show:
Proposition 4 The higher ρ the lower the optimal value of the feedback parameter C1.
The argument is that the higher ρ, the more leverage the central bank has over inﬂation expec-
tations via past inﬂation. If the central bank cares about the future (δ 6=0 ) , it will realize that it
faces lower output costs of disinﬂation and hence needs less monetary accommodation.
Thus, the central bank’s optimal choice of πtis inversely related to the ex ante credibility of the
regime change, or to the extent to which private sector inﬂation expectations are anchored at long
horizons.
8By substituting (E6) into (E20) we can derive the solution for the inﬂation process under
teaching by doing
πt = C1ρπt−1 (23)
It can be seen that the greater the parameter C1, the greater the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation in
inﬂation (hence inﬂation persistence is now endogenous) Since this parameter is decreasing in the
central bank’s weight on inﬂation stabilisation a (see PROPOSITION 2), the greater the central
bank’s weight on inﬂation stabilisation, the smaller the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation in inﬂation (a
similar result as under discretion).22
Similarly, according to PROPOSITION 3, the higher the central bank’s discount factor δ,t h e
lower the optimal value of the parameter C1. Thus, if the central bank becomes more concerned
about the future (the longer its policy horizon and the higher δ), the lower the persistence of inﬂation.
It is interesting to contrast the persistence of inﬂation under “teaching by doing” with the case
of naïve discretion (the King model from section 2). Then, according to equation (6) (where we
have set π∗ =0 )the optimal inﬂation rate should decline as a constant proportion of the exogenous
expected inﬂation rate. Substituting (6) into (5) we ﬁnd that inﬂation under “naïve discretion” (in





If we contrast equation (E24) with equation (E23) we can easily see that inﬂation persistence
under teaching by doing is lower than inﬂation persistence under naïve discretion (the King model)
if C1 < 1
1+a. In Appendix A.1 we prove that this condition is always satisﬁed if a>0,t h a ti s ,i ft h e
central bank’s weight on inﬂation stabilisation is positive. Therefore we can ﬁnally state
Proposition 5 If the central bank’s weight on inﬂation stabilisation is positive (that is if a>0),
inﬂation persistence under ‘”teaching by doing”’ (endogenous inﬂa t i o np e r s i s t e n c e )i sa l w a y sl o w e r
than under naïve discretion (or doing without teaching as in the King model).
5D i s i n ﬂation in a Multi-Period Model with Private Sector
Learning
In Section 3 we assumed that that the central bank’s’ inﬂation stabilisation plan had full credibility
and that the only uncertainty was about its timing. In this section we relax this assumption.
More speciﬁcally, in line with Molnár and Santoro (2007)23 we assume that private agents do not
know the inﬂation target and hence are in the dark about the exact process followed by inﬂation, but
believe that inﬂation is a continuous invariant function of the inﬂation target only. This hypothesis
implies that the conditional and unconditional expectation of inﬂation coincides, and are perceived
by the private sector as a constant. All other assumptions and parameters remain as per section 2.
More speciﬁcally, suppose the private sector’s forecasting function for inﬂation takes the same
form as the rational expectations solution under full information (where 0 <a<∞),n a m e l y ,
equation
πRE = π∗ =0 (25)
The nature of imperfect information is such that, the private sector knows the correct functional
form of the forecasting rule, that is
πe
t = EPS
t−1 = γ (26)
22From PROPOSITION 4 we know that the feedback parameter C1is decreasing in the parameter ρ. Therefore,
the dependence of the degree of inﬂation persistence on ρ is given by ∂ (C1ρ)/∂ρ =( ∂C1/∂ρ)ρ + C1,w h e r et h es i g n
is ambiguous.
23They, however, focus on the case of constant gain learning in the context of a New-Keynesian model.
9but not the actual value of γ,w h e r eγ is a time-invariant constant (which is in fact equal to γ =
π∗ =0 )because it doesn’t know the central bank’s inﬂation target.
We assume that private sector’s expectations are formed according to the adaptive learning
literature; in particular, agents’ Perceived Law of Motion (PLM) is consistent with the Law of
Motion that the central bank would implement under the assumption of rational expectations. In
other words, inﬂation is assumed to be constant, and agents use a learning algorithm to ﬁnd out this
constant. We assume that private sector expectations evolve following a constant gain algorithm24:
Et−1πt = ct−1 = ct−2 + κ(πt−1 − ct−2) where κ ∈ (0,1) (27)
As pointed out by Sargent (1999, p. 96), constant gain algorithms discount past observations.
Other studies that use constant gain learning are Orphanides and Williams (2003), Milani (2005)
and Gaspar, Smets and Vestin (2006).
The sequence of events is similar to section 1. First, the private sector sets Eπ
t−1t. Then the
central bank observes Et−1πt and chooses πt.I ne a c hp e r i o dτ, the sequence of events is summarized
as follows. See Table 1 in the appendix.
We remark that the learning rule (E27) is equivalent to the traditional adaptive expectations
formula. Note also that it can be expressed as an exponentially weighted average of past inﬂation




i πt−i. In Appendix A.2 we show that the central bank’s optimal monetary
policy reaction function is πt = G1ct−1,w h e r eG1is an (initially) undetermined coeﬃcient and
0 ≤ G1 ≤ 1. Substituting this rule in (E27) we have
ct =[ 1+κ(G1 − 1)]ct−1 (28)
This is an AR(1) process which is stationary if |1+κ(G1 − 1) < 1|or κ(G1 − 1) < 0.S i n c e0 ≤ κ ≤ 1
and 0 ≤ G1 ≤ 1 this condition is always satisﬁed.
Setting ctequal to its steady-state value c,u s i n g(E28) it can be veriﬁed that c =[ 1+κ(G1 − 1)]c
or c =0 . So, the (asymptotic) mean of ct is equal to its rational expectations value of 0. Thus, the
private sector forecast is asymptotically unbiased.
As before we assume that the central bank has full knowledge of the process of private sector
learning, or in other words we have what Gaspar, Smets and Vestin (2006) call ‘sophisticated central
banking’.
Again it is convenient to deﬁnext = πe
t = Et−1πt = ct−1and ut = πt as the control, so that
zt = ut −xt. We solve this problem by the method of Lagrange multipliers. Introduce the Lagrange











2 − (uτ − xτ)
2i
−δ
τ−t+1μτ+1 [xτ+1 − (1 − κ)xτ − κuτ]
)#
(29)
In Appendix A.2 it is shown that the ﬁrst-order condition — or optimal feedback rule - for this
problem can be written as
πt = G1x = G1ct−1where 0 ≤ G1 ≤ 1 (30)
Thus, as was the case in section 4 it is optimal to partially accommodate inﬂation expectations.
Thus, as in Section 3 — where we use a two-period model - the central bank will always disinﬂate
faster than the private sector thinks.
Note that substituting (E30) into (E28) yields πt = G1 {ct−2 + κ(πt−1 − ct−2)}. Thus, adap-
tive learning can generate serial correlation in inﬂation though there is none in the fundamentals.
24Tesfaselassie and Schaling (2008) let the central bank learn using the Kalman ﬁlter, of which a constant gain
algorithm is a special case. For some useful analytics on ﬁltering see Sargent (1996, pp. 115-118).
10Table 2 in the appendix computes the optimal value of the accommodation parameter G1for
diﬀerent gain coeﬃcients between 0 and 0.2.
In all computations we have used a =1 and δ =0 .9.C o e ﬃcients between 0.015 and 0.025 are
common in empirical studies adapting constant-gain learning as Orphanides and Williams (2003)
and Milani (2005).
Table 2 shows that a higher gain parameter is associated with less monetary accommodation of
inﬂation expectations. The intuition is similar to that in Section 3. The argument is that the higher
κ, the more leverage the central bank has over inﬂation expectations via past inﬂation. If it cares
about the future (here δ =0 .9), it will realise that it faces lower output costs of disinﬂation and
hence needs less monetary accommodation.
6 Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have analysed disinﬂation in several environments. There are (at least) two impor-
tant dimensions of this issue. The ﬁrst is whether private sector expectations formation or updating
reﬂect (expectations of) the new monetary regime (characterised by lower inﬂation). The second is
whether the central bank properly internalises the fact that (rational) inﬂation expectations depend
on past inﬂation outcomes. We have seen that the King (1996) model does not properly reﬂect these
dimensions.
With respect to the second dimension we show that when the central bank realises that (ad hoc)
inﬂation expectations depend on past inﬂation, it always speeds up the disinﬂation and in this way
generates lower inﬂation persistence. So, we clarify why "speed" in the disinﬂation process does not
necessarily "kill" in the sense of creating large output losses.
This “speed” result also holds in an environment where private agents rationally learn about
the central bank’s inﬂation target using a constant gain algorithm. Of course, in this case the ﬁrst
dimension — namely the fact that inﬂation expectations should reﬂect the monetary regime — is also
properly addressed. In this case we also show that adaptive learning can generate serial correlation
in inﬂation, though there is none in the fundamentals.
The results above were obtained in an environment with an “old-fashioned” Phillips curve. How-
ever, we expect results would broadly carry over into the New Keynesian environment. For an
analysis about learning and uniqueness of rational expectations in such an environment, see Bullard
and Schaling (2009).
7 APPENDIX A OPTIMAL DISINFLATION
7.1 Derivation of the First-Order Condition in Section 4
Now, the central bank’s problem is to choose {πτ}
∞









zt = πt − Et−1πt (A2)
and
Et−1πt = ρπt−1 (A3)
It is convenient to deﬁne xt = Et−1πt as the state variable and ut = πt as the control, so the central
bank’s problem is to choose {uτ}
∞
τ=t. We solve this problem by the method of Lagrange multipliers.










2 − (uτ − xτ)
2i
−δ
τ−t+1μτ+1 [xτ+1 − ρuτ]
)#
(A4)
The central bank’s ﬁrst-order conditions take the form
∂L
∂ut
= −a(ut) − (ut − xt)+δρEtμt+1 =0 (A5)
∂L
∂xt+1
= δ(ut+1) − (xt+1)+δEtμt+1 =0 (A6)
Using the lag operator L (which operates on the time-subscript of a variable, not on the time at
which the expectation is held) on (A.6) we obtain
(ut − xt) − μt =0 (A7)
Next, we ﬁnd an expression for Etμt+1.L e a d i n g (A7) by one period and taking expectations
we get:
Etμ t+1 =( Etut+1 − Etxt+1) (A8)
Substituting (A.8) into (A.5),w ec a nd e r i v et h eE u l e re q u a t i o n
−a(ut) − (ut − xt)+δρ(Etut+1 − Etxt+1)=0 (A9)
In the case of a policy of strict inﬂation reduction, the rule would be
ut =0 (A10)
Similarly, in the case of full accommodation of expectations, the rule would be
ut = xt (A11)
Thus, it appears that in case of ﬂexible inﬂation targeting, the rule will be a linear combination
of (A.10) and (A.11),t h a ti sut = cxt,w h e r e0 ≤ c ≤ 1. Or alternatively,
ut = C1xt (A12)
which is equation (20) in the main text (where I have substituted xt = Et−1πt and ut = πt).Here
the coeﬃcient C1 remains to be determined, and the prior is that 0 ≤ C1 ≤ 1.N o ww ei d e n t i f yt h e
coeﬃcient C1.
Expectations for the state at period t +1follow from the constraint in (A.4). Combining the
latter with the decision rule for u,w ec a nw r i t e :
Expectations for the state at period follow from the constraint in (A.1). Combining the latter
with the decision rule for , we can write:
t t t x C x E 1 1 ρ = + (A13)
From (A.8) it follows that
 
t t t t t t x C x C C x E C u E
2
1 1 1 1 1 1 ) ( ] [ ρ ρ = = = + + (A14)
25It is easy to convert the Lagrangean (A.1) into the standard form used by Schaling (2004) by setting τ =0 in
(A.1). Then the central bank chooses the sequence {πt}∞
t=0 rather than {πτ}∞
τ=t.
12Substituting (A.13) and (A.14) into the Euler equation (A.9) above, and equating constant terms
and coeﬃcients on the state variable yields the following expression for in terms of the structural
parameters of the model











Equation (A.15) implicitly deﬁnes the value of C1.I t c a n b e w r i t t e n a s C1 = F (C1) .N o t e t h a t
the function F (C1) on the RHS with domain h0,1i is monotonically increasing in C1,t h a t,
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We realise that there is a unique positive solution C1 ,w h i c hf u l ﬁlls
1 1 1 C C C < <
where


















I tc a nb es o l v e da n a l y t i c a l l y :






























If we contrast equation (E24) with (E23), it is clear that disinﬂation under commitment (with
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13From (A.19) we see that if the term inside the square brackets (hereafter [ ]) is equal to 1, C1 =
1
1+aand optimal disinﬂation under commitment is equal to optimal disinﬂation under naïve discre-
tion. It can be easily seen from (A.19) that if (1 + a)C2
1 =1 , the relevant term ([ ]) is equal to 1.
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We also know from (A.16) that C
¯






























and (A.20) is satisﬁed. Therefore, all that remains to be done is to show if and when the inequality
(A.22) is satisﬁed . (A.22) can be rewritten as
( ) a + < 1
2 δρ
(A23)
As 0 <δ≤ 1 and 0 <ρ≤ 1, the LHS of this inequality is bounded between 0 and 1. Since
0 ≤ a<∞ the RHS is bounded between 1 and ∞. Therefore, we can now prove:
Proposition A1 If the central bank’s weight on inﬂation stabilization is positive (that is if ),
optimal disinﬂation teaching by doing is always faster than optimal disinﬂation under naïve
discretion.
Proof. If a>0, condition (A.23) is satisﬁed. This implies that (A.20) holds. Next, if (A.20) is
satisﬁed, (A.18) holds, that is, C1 < 1
1+a,s ot h a td i s i n ﬂation under teaching by doing is faster than
under naïve discretion. QED























this implies that when a goes up, the function F (C1)shifts downward. As a consequence, the
equilibrium value of C1 decreases.
Proposition A3 The higher δ the lower the optimal value of the feedback parameter C1
Proof.

















Note that the numerator of this expression is negative if C1 <
q
1
1+a. This condition always holds,
since the inequality (A.22) is satisﬁed (see above).
Proposition A4 The higher ρ the lower the optimal value of the feedback parameter C1 .
Proof.
























For more details see PROPOSITION A3 above.
8 Derivation of the First-Order Condition in Section 5
Now, the central bank’s problem is to choose




= = t t u τ τ τ τ π
so as to maximize (2) subject to (1) and
  ) ( 2 1 2 1 1 − − − − − − + = = t t t t t t c c c E π κ π
(A24)
It is convenient to deﬁne xt = Et−1π1 = ct−1as the state variable. We solve this problem by the
method of Lagrange multipliers. Introduce the Lagrange multiplier μ, and consider the Lagrangean
expression
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15Note that we have set up the constraint in such a way to make sure that if β → 0(A.25) collapses
to (A.4) — and thus all results are identical to those derived in Appendix A.1 above. Similarly, if
β → 1and ρ = κ
− we have the constraint (A.24) and thus are dealing with the derivation of the
ﬁrst-order condition in Section 5. The central bank’s ﬁrst-order conditions are (A.5) and
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t
E E x u
x
L
μ κ β δ μ δ δ
(A26)
Lagging (A.26) by one period and dividing through by δ we obtain
 ( ) ( ) t t t t t E x u μ μ κ δβ = − + − +1 1 26 (A27)
To solve for the ﬁrst-order conditions (A.5) and (A.27) we conjecture the following solution
for μ(x)
x A x 1 ) ( = μ (A28)
In the ﬁrst step of the solution procedure we use we use (A.28) in (A.5) to yield
  ⎣ ⎦ 0 ) ( ) ( 1 1 = + − − − + t t t t t x E A x u u a δρ
(A29)
Using the constraint we get
  0 ) 1 ( ) ( ) (
2
1 1 = + − + − − − t t t t t u A x A x u u a ρ δ κ δρβ
(A30)




















In the next step observe
1 1 1 + + = t t t t x E A E μ
or
( ) { } t t t t u x A E ρ κ β μ + − = + 1 1 1
Using that u = G1x yields
( ) [ ] t t t x G A E 1 1 1 1 ρ κ β μ + − = + (A32)
which is linear in x.




16  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] { } t t t x G A G A x A 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 ρ κ β κ δβ μ + − − + − = + =
equating coeﬃcients on both sides gives
  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] {} 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 G A G A ρ κ β κ δβ + − − + − = (A33)
Equations (A.31) and (A.33) are used to solve for G1and A1.W e n o w f o c u s o n t h e s o l u t i o n
for G1, which is informative about the degree to which the central bank accommodates inﬂation
expectations.
I no r d e rt od os o ,ﬁrst rewrite (A.33) as
 
() () [] {} 1
1









Now we numerically solve for the (initially undetermined) coeﬃcient G1 in terms of the model’s
structural parameters.
T h ep r o c e d u r ei st oﬁrst compute (A.34) for one set of structural parameters (including an ad


















where β =1and ρ = κ
−
Finally we plug the computed value of (A.34) in (A.35) and numerically solve for .
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2a) Central bank chooses 
( ) τ τ τ τ π π π 1 − = E   
2c) Inflation realises 
2d) Private sector observes 
τ π and forms an updated  
estimate 
( ) 1 1 1 − − + − + = = τ τ τ τ τ τ π κ π c c c E  
 
Stage 3 
Back to stage 1 for time 







Table 2:  Gain Parameter and Monetary Accommodation 
 
 
κ   1 G   κ   1 G  
0  0.500 0.025 0.456 
0.015 0.471 0.1  0.400 
0.020 0.463 0.2  0.387 
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